Jonathan Lacey
Department of Sociology, Trinity College Dublin
(e-mail: laceyjo@tcd.ie)
Abstract
In recent years there has been a growing interest amongst sociologists regarding the transnational engagements of migrant communities. However, though religious communities are amongst the oldest transnational actors, sociologists have largely ignored their transnational arrangements. This paper contributes to this gap in the research by focusing on the transnational engagements of a religio-cultural community living in Ireland. My analysis shows that TIECS is affiliated with a religious-inspired civic movement based in Turkey, known as the Gülen Community and founded by an Islamic spiritual leader Fethullah Gülen. Throughout this paper I illustrate the transnational connections between TIECS and the Gülen Community. Focusing on the group composition of TIECS, I describe this society as a transnational community and examine the transnational character of two of its pursuits: interfaith symposiums and guided trips to Turkey. Drawing on the grammar of network analysis, I describe the relationship between TIECS and the Gülen Community.
Introduction
Transnationalism is in the air. Expansion of transnational capital and mass media to even the remotest of hinterlands has provoked a spate of discourse on ‘globalisation’, ‘transnationalism’, and the ‘crisis of the nation state (Guarnizo and Smith 2004: 3).
Indeed Smith and Guarnizo are correct; the theme of transnationalism appears across many academic disciplines and refers to an infinite amount of cross border flows. The concept of transnationalism refers to the cross border flows of various kinds, including trade, finance and capital, people, technology, culture and ideas (Vertovec 2000; Castles and Miller 2003). Increases in telecommunications means that people can connect with others across borders with great ease, whilst in the aviation industry technological advancements have led to low airfares and extensive flight destinations. These factors have led to a dramatic increase in international migration and the emergence of transnational social movements over the last three decades. Debates are raging between those who argue that transnational activity is undermining the nation state and those who maintain that the nation state remains the most important actor in both national and transnational affairs (Held et al. 2003). Though most academics attention has been drawn to cross border flows of capital and technology, more recently attention has been given to the transnational flows and networks of migrants who engage in activities in both their country of origin and their country of settlement (Portes et al. 1999; Vertovec 1999; Levitt 2001). However, though religious movements have been amongst the oldest transnational actors they have attracted little academic attention (Küçükcan 1999; Rudolph 1997).
This paper exploits this gap in the research by focusing on the transnational engagements of a Turkic religio-cultural society living in Dublin, known as the Turkish Irish Educational and Cultural Society (TIECS). The society is affiliated with a Turkish social movement known as the Gülen Community. I am principally interested in the transnational connections between TIECS and the Gülen Community and how the presence of such an organisation reflects the changing nature of Irish society.
Before describing how I came in contact with members of TIECS, I relate some demographics regarding the number of Turkish migrants living in Ireland. According to the Turkish embassy in Ireland, there are 650 Turkish migrants living in the Republic of Ireland (phone call with the Turkish embassy, 21 February, 2006). However, this is contested by Turkish migrants themselves who suggest it is between 2,000 and 3,000. The Turkish embassy may have an investment in down-playing the number of Turks in Ireland given the negative reception of Turks in other European countries, such as Germany, Holland and France (Castles and Miller 2003; Atalik and Beeley 1993). Another reason for understating these statistics may be due to the negative attention the Turkish construction company GAMA received vis-à-vis the alleged underpaying of workers (Barry 2006). Coupled with the ever increasing racism in Ireland (Lentin and McVeigh 2002; Garner 2004), the embassy may have thought it wise to keep its guesstimate low. The numbers provided by the Turkish embassy are only an educated guess, as Turkish migrants do not have to declare themselves at the embassy on arrival.
My interest in Turkey was precipitated by its geopolitical significance in the world, as well as its cultural ambivalence, typically expressed through Turkish migrants in Europe (Robins 1996). My realisation of the growing numbers of Turkish migrants in Ireland was largely serendipity. A young man was disseminating leaflets outside the gates of Trinity College Dublin. The brochures advertised free Turkish lessons. From this point on I began to attend the Turkish lessons and a variety of other activities organised by TIECS. I have been engaged in participant observation since November 2005 to July 2006. This paper is based on this ethnographic work as well as a number of qualitative interviews. Turkish migrants in Ireland have yet to show up on the sociological radar. This is why I believe this paper is so important. However, my study will be specific to one type of the Turkic[1] community in Ireland, namely TIECS.
It was through ongoing ethnography and in-depth interviews with members of TIECS that I discovered that this society is affiliated with a transnational ‘religiously motivated civic movement’ (Saritoprak 2005: 325), namely the Gülen Community, which has its origins in Turkey. Following the next section of this article, which surveys some theoretical literature vis-à-vis transnational migration, I briefly outline the biographical details of Fethullah Gülen and the movement that has gathered around him. This is followed by a description of TIECS’ inception and a critical analysis of their various activities. I discuss the interfaith conferences organised by TIECS, which are dedicated to the celebration of the Abrahamic religions. I argue that the main aim of these conferences is promoting a tolerant image of Islam and further support the idea that due to historical, geographical and cultural reasons, we can talk of Islam in the plural sense (Küçükcan 1999). Drawing on the work of M. Hakan Yavuz (2004), I argue that TIECS and the Gülen Community practice ‘Turkish Islam’. Subsequent to this is a focus on Turkish trips organised by TIECS for Irish people and others. This is the most explicit transnational activity TIECS is engaged in. These trips are heavily subsidised by businessmen affiliated with the Gülen Community. I raise the question of the motivation for these subsidies. Finally this paper describes TIECS’ transnational relationship with other Gülen Community members as a network. This section uses the grammar of network analysis in order to describe these connections in a systematic way.
Transnational Communities
In 1999, Alejandro Portes et al. edited an issue of Ethnic and Racial Studies devoted to the subject of Transnational Communities. Their introductory article in this edition is largely seen as the blueprint for this developing idea. They maintain that
This field is composed of a growing number of persons who live dual lives: speaking two languages, having homes in two countries, and making a living through continuous regular contact across national borders (1999: 217).
Their articulation of this concept refers to the intensity of cross-border flows of various kinds which leads to migrants living their lives in more than one place simultaneously. For example, due to advancements in technology migrants can easily trade, travel and communicate with their ‘homeland’ with such fluency that was absent in any previous generations. They recognize that it is not an entirely new phenomenon but that it is intensified in our age and worthy of attention and a separate area of examination within migration studies. They insist that in previous ages transnationalism was peculiar to elite cosmopolitans. Now this type of transnationalism exists from ‘above’ and ‘below’. The ‘above’ form of transnational immigration constitutes businessmen who work for transnational companies, living in at least two nations simultaneously. The ‘below’ type of transnational immigration involves members of diaspora groups, who similarly engage in transnational activities, be they cultural, economic, social or political.
Much of the social scientific work on globalisation articulates it as a malign form of activity that attempts to homogenize culture, economics and politics. However Portes et al. (1999) view globalisation and the necessary accompaniment of exacerbated transnationalist activity as a site of potential liberation for international migrants. They note that most international migrants engage in poorly paid sectors of the economy, such as agriculture and the low-skilled services sectors. They argue that due to the growth in immigrant populations and the growing market for ‘ethnic’ goods, news and services, a niche market has opened up for migrants, which allows them to take a prominent role in the international capitalist system. These ‘grass-roots transnational activities’ (ibid: 220) are generally unaided by the state and to some extent circumvent and subvert the state as the sole arbitrator in economic, social, cultural and political management. They also argue that this form of activity can be understood as anti-assimilationist. They insist that ‘…success does not so much depend on abandoning their culture and language to embrace those of another society as on preserving their original cultural endowment, while adapting instrumentally to the second’ (ibid: 229). This benefit is understood as one of the most liberating forces of transnational communities and may be understood as strengthening ‘primordial’ bonds amongst immigrants and their home country.
Portes et al. (1999) emphasise economics as the primary element, and ‘transnational entrepreneurs’ as the key members, of transnational migrant communities. However, they note that this often leads to other forms of organisation, such as political and ‘socio-cultural enterprises oriented towards the reinforcement of a national identity abroad or the collective enjoyment of cultural events and goods’ (ibid: 221). The political activities may involve politicians in the home country lobbying migrants for votes and encouraging them to invest in their country of origin. The socio-cultural events may include anything from soccer games with people from their country of origin to musical groups traveling to the immigrants from the home country in order to entertain them. Other commitments may include immigrants supporting the building of churches or schools in their country of origin. It is on this theme that Helen Rose Ebuagh and Janet Saltzman Chafetz have also contributed to the debate on Transnational Communities. Their edited book Religion Across Borders: Transnational Immigrant Networks focuses on how immigrants to Houston (USA) attempt to recreate their home-context in their host society and the cross-border flows that necessarily take place as a result. Their principal examination is on the recreation of the Christian religious context (though other faiths are also discussed) and the resulting networks that by-pass territorial boundaries. I attempt to draw from the above literature, though offering something new by focusing on one group of Turkic migrants living in Ireland, an area previously undocumented.
Fethullah Gülen and the Gülen Community
The Gülen-inspired publishing company, Fountain, describes Fethullah Gülen as follows: ‘An intellectual with a distinctive spiritual charisma, a prolific writer and poet, M. Fethullah Gülen has been an extremely effective and popular scholar of Islam for the last three decades’ (Fountain 2002: i). This type of description is echoed by other scholars, including the political scientist, M. Hakan Yavuz (2003) and the Islamic theologian, Zeki Saritoprak (2005). Gülen was born in Turkey, where he eventually became a licensed Imam and subsequently an esteemed writer and orator. As well as being educated in Islamic theology, he is also well versed in the natural and social sciences and has reportedly ‘tried to synthesize positive science with religion, reconcile their apparent differences, and bring the ideologies and philosophies of East and West closer together’ (Fountain 2002: 4). Though he has largely been influenced by the Sufi tradition, and indeed wrote a best-selling book (Gülen 2004) on its major principles, he never established anything like a Sufi order (Gokcek, 2005). While I do not intend to delve into the theology of Sufism or Islam itself, at this stage it suffices to say that Sufism is based on a spiritual reading of the Quran. It is largely an ascetic lifestyle that claims to help bring one closer to God and emphasises tolerance towards all people (Werbner 2003; Gülen 2002; Saritoprak 2003). The anthropologist Pnina Werbner claims that ‘Sufism and its world-renouncing saints are almost everywhere committed to peaceful coexistence and tolerance’ (2003: 7). This emphasis on tolerance and asceticism is particularly emphasised by Gülen. Along with this, his adherence to the secular state has gained him favour with several important Turkish politicians and his charisma, heart-felt speeches, ascetic lifestyle and his prolific writings have gained him millions of followers amongst the Turkish public. Gülen offers his supporters a worldview that is grounded in Islam and more specifically in the Sufi tradition. From a sociological perspective, Gülen becomes most interesting when one begins to analyse the movement that has grown up around him, namely, the Gülen Community. Ihsan Yilmaz, a law lecturer in the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in the University of London, insists that there is a consensus in diagnosing this Community as the ‘largest civil society movement’ in Turkey (2005: 394).
According to the political scientist, M. Hakan Yavuz: ‘The [Gülen] movement is based on three coordinated tiers: businessmen, journalists, and teachers and students’ (2003: 179). All of these tiers work mutually and interactively in order to operationalise the goals of Fethullah Gülen. Gülen has attracted the attention of a large proportion of the wealthy ‘Anatolian bourgeoisie’ (Yavuz 2003: 184), whose members have developed a vast financial infrastructure to support the activities of the Gülen Community. These initiatives include support for ‘400 private high schools, universities and colleges, dormitories, summer camps, and over 100 foundations’ (Yavuz 2003: 192) predominantly in Turkey, Central Asia and the Balkans. The Gülen Community also boasts a media empire which owns one of the leading Turkish dailies, Zaman, a Turkish television station, STV, and various magazines and academic journals relating to religion, science and technology (Yavuz 2003; Pope 1998).
Articulating TIECS as a Transnational Community
TIECS was established by Turkish labour migrants living in Ireland. The precursor to TIECS involved gatherings of Turkish migrants congregating in order to deal with common bureaucratic issues such as visa problems. Another issue discussed amongst these migrants at this early stage concerned the socialisation of their children in a society dominated by a different culture than their own.
From these early meetings, these Turkish migrants were adamant that they did not want to assimilate into Irish society. They rather intend to simultaneously integrate whilst preserving their own culture and traditions and passing these down to their children. Integration according to these early members was the key to successful settlement. The experience of Turkish migrants in Germany was anathema to their goals. They claim that many of the Turks in Germany live out their lives with little interaction with the majority population and this has led to their isolation. The anti-assimilations policy of TIECS echoes the experience of ‘below’ transnational communities discussed by Portes et al. (1999).
As these Turkish migrants settled down a few years ago, bureaucratic issues became less urgent. They began to focus on developing a social and cultural society. This is consistent with Portes et al.’s (1999) position that generally transnational communities firstly focus on setting themselves up financially and subsequently turn their attention to organising a society peculiar to their culture. In this context it culminated in the establishment of TIECS in 2004. It is my contention that TIECS was established by members who can be categorised as part of the Turkish diaspora living in Ireland. Its composition, however, has changed and it now includes temporary migrants from Turkey and Turkmenistan. These migrants were recruited in order to build up an affiliate of the Gülen Community in Ireland. With the growth of the organisation and the lack of manpower, other members of the Gülen Community were recruited. Before moving on, I illustrate why I believe the early members of TIECS can be considered as members of a diaspora.
Focusing on the Greek origins of the term, diaspora, Robin Cohen (1995) argues that emphasising only its negative interpretation is unnecessarily limiting. Diaspora has its roots in the words ‘dispersion’ and ‘to sow or scatter’ (Cohen 1995: 6). It refers to the scattering of people and remains semantically neutral regarding the nature of the dispersion. Following this etymological emphasis, I maintain that diaspora involves both the forced and voluntary movement of people (Braziel and Mannur 2003).
I concur with Cohen’s proposition that not all forms of international migration can be considered diasporas. For Cohen a diaspora is characterised by a consistent attempt to affiliate ones identity with others from their cultural group, based on elements of language, religion, ethnicity and a variety of other ‘cultural norms’ (1997: 58). Another important characteristic, according to Cohen, is ‘a myth of and strong connection to the homeland’ (1997: 58). In this sense the migration of Turkish workers to Europe since the 1960’s can be referred to as a diaspora (Castles and Kosack 1985; Landau 1996). Gogolin and Reich note that in many German cities, for example, Turks have carved out neighbourhoods with a ‘quasi-oriental character’ (2001: 198). In such areas, one can acquire all one’s daily needs, including goods and services, through the Turkish language. There are much fewer Turkish migrants living in Ireland. Through their various activities, however, these Turkish members of TIECS fit Cohen’s criteria. Firstly they have developed a society based on ethno-religious principles and show a consistent tangible commitment to their homeland by organising trips to Turkey several times per year. They arrange Turkish language courses and through interfaith conferences promote a Turkish view of Islam. These activities will be discussed in depth in a subsequent section.
Marienstra makes an important distinction between temporary migrants and diaspora members claiming that the reality of a diaspora ‘is proved in time and tested by time’ (cited in Van Hear 1998: 6). I support this view and insist that the establishment of a society such a TIECS represents a commitment to remaining in the host country for the medium to long term. The early members of TIECS have all been living in Ireland for several years. It is for these reasons that I feel confident referring to these early members of TIECS as members of the overall Turkish diaspora. These diaspora members belong to the more benign form of migration which is of a voluntary nature. I now argue that TIECS can be referred to as a transnational community.
Several commentators (Portes et al. 1999; Levitt 2001) point out that though not all diaspora members are part of a transnational community, a transnational community must involve some members of a diaspora. Diaspora members, they argue, are the glue that makes transnational communities durable. Diaspora communities are not synonymous with transnational communities but they run concomitant. Indeed transnational communities depend on diaspora communities but the latter does not depend on the former. Kachig Tölölyan suggests that diaspora communities are ‘the exemplary communities of the transnational movement’ (1991: 5; cited in Vertovec 1999: 449). Portes (2001), however, notes that only a small percentage of diaspora communities are actually engaged in sustained transnational activities and can therefore be referred to as a transnational community.
Whilst a transnational community depends on diaspora members for its existence, not all members of the community are necessarily part of a diaspora. For example, those actors who remain in their homeland and engage in transnational practices with members of their diaspora across borders may be said to be an integral part of the transnational community (Portes et al. 1999). Likewise, I maintain that people who cross borders temporarily in order to aid members of the diaspora in economic, social or cultural activities can also be claimed as part of the transnational community. As mentioned above TIECS has indeed recruited several members of the Gülen transnational community in order to strengthen their society. These temporary migrants expect to stay for periods of one or two years before returning home. So although several members of TIECS are not members of the diaspora, they remain an integral part of the transnational community. Indeed, several current members of TIECS were members of the Gülen transnational community before joining this group in Ireland. It is my view that all the members of TIECS are living ‘dual lives’ and have what Peggy Levitt refers to as the ‘access to social and institutional resources that imbue them with the potential to remain active in two worlds’ (2001: 6). They have their feet steeped in at least two places at once. Indeed, given the transnational character of the Gülen Community, they may have their feet steeped in several countries at once.
Continuing my assessment of the nature of transnational communities, I find it useful to draw on the work of Patricia Fortuny-Loret De Mola, whose study of the transnational network of a migrant Christian Church in the United States specifically refers to her participants as a transnational community:
I have chosen to use the term transnational community rather than other terms because religion is the central feature that defines the groups and keeps it together. It operates as a “moral community” (in Durkeimian terms), firmly built on a system of shared meanings, norms, practices, loyalty, and, above all, a strong collective identity… Applying the notion of community to a religious group is indeed more adequate since it implies a strong collective moral consciousness that acts as the main integrating force encompassing members on both sides of the border…(Fortuny-Loret De Mola 2002: 18-19).
In a similar light to Fortuny-Loret De Mola, I can confidently describe TIECS as a transnational community. TIECS offers a sense of belonging to its members. As mentioned before, this sense of belonging is largely based on a Turkic connection (see footnote[1]) and a commitment to the principles of the Islamic mystic, Fethullah Gülen. These principles include a dedication to the basic tenets of Islam, which according to Gülen, emphasise peace and tolerance. This common outlook of TIECS’s members creates solidarity and helps construct and reinforce their social identity. They maintain durable connections with each other which involve support and sociability through their various activities. They also sustain close contact with the Gülen Community across various territorial boundaries. This is often aided through telecommunications. The next section looks critically at some of the pursuits of this transnational community and critically analyse the motivation for initiating these endeavours.
Interfaith Dialogue and Turkish Islam
TIECS held two conferences celebrating the ‘Abrahamic Religions’; Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In 2005 the conference was staged in the University College Dublin (UCD) and in 2006 it was held in Trinity College Dublin (TCD). There were speakers from each of the three religions and all were interested in promoting interfaith dialogue. The Jewish and Christian speakers were residents of Ireland, whilst the Muslim speakers were not. They were rather of Turkish origin, living in London, and related to Gülen-inspired organisations in England. In 2005 Kerim Balci, a journalist with the Gülen-inspired Zaman newspaper represented the Muslim view of interfaith dialogue. In 2006, Ozcan Kelesh, of the Dialogue Society (a Gülen-inspired organisation promoting interfaith dialogue), spoke on the theme of compassion in Islam. The courting of these followers of Gülen to speak at the conference is an illustration of the transnational connections between different societies within the Gülen Community. Furthermore the theme of the conference was a replication of others taking place in Turkey, inspired by the thought of Fethullah Gülen. This is a further illustration of the transnational connections and flow of ideas amongst the globalised Gülen Community. I asked one member of TIECS, Turgut,[2] why this society organised these conferences:
The conferences are so important to introduce…the correct Islamic views to the society, because nowadays Islam is one of the main religions, which is…[misunderstood] by the people, especially in the Western world. There are many reasons and also because of the mistakes of some Muslims... Also because of bias[es] and prejudices by some of the intellectuals in the western world. So as a Muslim, we believe we have some responsibility to introduce our belief to the society… some people have forced it to be recognised as a kind of religion for violence. And it was not easy for us to accept this without doing anything. The conference series is one of the projects with which we would like to tackle this misunderstanding problem...
From this excerpt we can see that the main aim of the interfaith conferences organised by TIECS is to ‘introduce the correct Islamic views’. It may be argued that interfaith dialogue is of secondary importance to members of TIECS whilst promoting a tolerant understanding of Islam is the main objective. This is understandable given the imbalanced nature of reports regarding Muslims in both academia and the mainstream media. Turgut maintains that Islam has been largely misunderstood in the Western world. He blames both the ‘prejudices’ of various intellectuals towards Islam and indeed some Muslims who ‘misinterpret’ the Koran and engage in violence. With regards to the former, Edward Said (1997) has taken up this theme. He attempts to illustrate how the majority of opinion-makers in Europe and America, both journalists and academics, have predominantly portrayed Islam as a monolithic group determined to challenge the West through terrorist activities. Said points out that many Western scholars understand western civilization as complex and heterogeneous and have devised a multitude of theories in an attempt to understand its multifaceted nature. Yet when it comes to Islamic society, it is treated as a single undifferentiated group. Aziz Al-Azmeh is critical of this view and rightly argues that ‘there are as many Islams as there are situations that sustain it’ (cited in Yilmaz 2005: 385). Too often ignored are the distinguishing factors of geography, culture and history. These features are integral in order to account for the manifold differences across borders (both territorial and symbolic). This point is supported by the Turkish-born sociologist Talip Küçükcan, who argues that ‘Islamic movements are very diverse in terms of their clientele, origins, ideology and composition. This leads us to conclude that one should talk about “Islams” in the modern world rather than one bounded and fixed “Islam”’ (1999: 191). Social, historical and geographical conditions must be taken into consideration when discussing what one means by ‘Islam’. At this juncture I am interested in what type of ‘Islam’ is articulated by Fethullah Gülen and adopted in the interfaith conferences organised by TIECS.
Yavuz (2004) concurs with Küçükcan’s position regarding the existence of multiple ‘Islams’. He maintains that there are seven different ‘ethno-cultural’ zones of Islam: Arab countries, Persia, Turkey, South Asia, Malay-Indonesia, African and places where Islam is a minority faith (Yavuz 2004: 215). Each zone is peculiar to a particular region and its interpretations of Islam differ due to a variety of factors: ‘Each zone’s understanding of Islam is primarily informed by its own national culture and by diverse historical and economic factors’ (Yavuz 2004: 215). He argues that Turkey has its own zone that offers something unique regarding Islamic thought. This zone, however, is not restricted to the territorial boundaries of Turkey but rather refers to the Turkic people. Yavuz draws on Ahmet Ocak, who suggests that ‘We should accept the fact that there is a specific way of being Muslim which reflects the Turkish understanding and practices in those region [which] stretch from Central Asia to the Balkans’ (Yavuz 2004: 218). Ocak refers to this form of Islam as ‘Turkish Islam’. Yavuz argues that it differs vastly from Arab and Persian Islam regarding ‘the interpretation of Islamic principles’ (Yavuz, 2004: 218). He argues that Sufism is an integral part of Turkish Islam and the ‘Turkish understanding of Islam is very much punctuated by the tolerance of Rumi, love of Yunus and reasonability of Hacı Bektasi Veli’ (Yavuz 2004: 219). Rumi, Yunus and Hacı Bektasi Veli are all Turkish Sufi mystics. According to Yavuz they have been extremely influential to Turkish Islam.
The Turkish sociologist, Nur Vergin, significantly points out that Turkish Muslims have created a ‘territorialized version of Islam’ (cited in Yavuz 2004: 218). Yavuz (2004) contends that this can be traced back to the reign of the founding father of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Yavuz argues that ‘[w]hen Islam was suppressed and forced out of the public sphere during the first three decades of Kemalist secularization program, nationalism became the only habitat where many Muslim intellectuals could take refuge’ (2004: 222). This left an indelible mark on Islamic thought in Turkey. It became intertwined with nationalism and thus leads us to refer to Islamic practice in Turkey as Turkish Islam.
According to Kösebalaban (2003), Fethullah Gülen subscribes to this version of Turkish Islam. For Gülen, Turkish Islam embraces the former Ottoman Balkan territories as well as Central Asia. Gülen’s national articulation of Turkish Islam does not however embrace all of the former Ottoman territories. Notably his activities in Arab lands are almost negligible. Gülen understands the practice of Islam in the Middle East as quite different to Turkish Islam. Indeed he holds contempt for the practice of Islam in Iran, claiming that Iran is ‘a sick part of the body of Islam’ (cited in Kösebalaban 2003:180). His disapproval of Iran stems from his disapproval of a theocratic state. Gülen is a committed Turkish nationalist and secularist, believing that religion and politics should be separate.
Through TIECS interfaith conferences, members naturally attempt to promote Islam as they understand it. In the two conferences they have held so far, the Muslim speakers were of Turkish origin and members of Gülen-affiliated groups. They emphasised ‘tolerance’, ‘love’ and the ‘reasonability’ of Islam as promoted by Gülen and other Turkish Sufi mystics. There is, however, competition regarding the interpretation of Islam in Ireland. Islam is the fastest growing religion in Ireland today, with over 31,000 members according to recent figures from the 2006 Census (CSO 2007). These followers of Islam come from many different regions in the world, including Ireland, and from all the Islamic zones mentioned by Yavuz (2004). TIECS is now involved in a competitive market with other interpretations of Islam. While its mission is not to proselytise, it does want to persuade people of its version of Islam which is steeped in the tradition of Turkish Sufism and can be referred to as Turkish Islam. Turkish Islam is transnational in the sense that it flows across borders connecting those who adhere to its tenets. The promotion of Turkish Islam by TIECS is another illustration of their transnational activity. They are in constant contact with their roots in Turkey. They draw upon the work and thought of Fethullah Gülen who articulates this position and whose ideas can be easily accessed through the massive media conglomerate inspired by him.
Turkey Trip and the Businessmen
For the last couple of years TIECS has been involved in organising one-week trips to Turkey for Irish people and others. I went on one of these trips as part of my ongoing ethnography. One interviewee describes the reasons for organising these trips:
… for example, if you met with us and you met with some Turkish Muslim people and you like them and if somebody says that all…Muslims are terrorists, you can say that it is not true. It is the same for us, if somebody says that all Christians want to kill the Muslims…[we] can tell them different… we would like to give the…opportunit[y] to our Irish friends to go to our own country and to see what kind of environment we are brought up in. This idea works, really. This idea works and it motivates people who are doing this job and who sacrifice their time and money. And because it is really working well.
These trips to Turkey may be understood as an extension of intercultural dialogue. TIECS members argue that they are designed to break down religious and cultural barriers between different nations and peoples. As part of the trip I went on, we travelled to Istanbul, Antalya and Konya, guided by members of TIECS and members of the Gülen Community living in Turkey. We visited many historical, cultural and religious sites, stayed in top class hotels, ate in beautiful restaurants and spent time socialising in the homes of members of the Gülen Community. On the final day we visited the Gülen-inspired media network of STV and the Foundation of Journalists and writers. We were warmly welcomed and received gifts of Fethullah Gülen’s books.
What most activated my sociological imagination was the cost of the trip. We each paid €400 for the whole trip, which included the hotels, breakfast, dinner and tea (usually in restaurants), entry into several museums and internal and external flights. I asked members of TIECS who was subsidising these trips and why. One interviewee responded:
And the Turkey trip. We are in this context with the help from our friends from Turkey. Otherwise we cannot manage ourselves. So this and also we got experience from friends who live in the UK. Because in UK the Turkish community, they are older than us. In Ireland, maybe we can say the last ten years, Turkish immigrants came. But in UK the last 30 or 40 years and they have more experiences…And also as far as I know from the United States some friends also, they are going to Turkey and the same businessmen are also supporting. Some countries like the United States, ourselves, maybe the UK. Our business friends, they say ok, if you bring some people, we will host. We will contribute to the cost and then you can get their tickets and you can get your own costs because they know we are also working with a very limited budget, mostly donations and some funds… So these are the guys who have the similar vision with us.
This gives us a clearer picture of the network of the Gülen Community and the transnational endeavours of TIECS. Though many of the affiliate Gülen-inspired organisations remain largely autonomous, there are various ties that link them. The business people are part of the three-tier system, mentioned earlier, that sustains and augments the Gülen Community, namely, the media, businessmen and teachers and students (Yavuz, 2003). These businessmen are inspired by the ideas of Gülen and give financial support to his various activities around the world. TIECS, amongst other groups, is a beneficiary of such donations.
Patricia Fortuny-Loret De Mola (2002) notes that the most distinguishing feature of transnational migration as opposed to any other social process is the consistent and sustained ties of the migrants with their home country. The trip to Turkey organised by TIECS is an explicit transnational act. It is not a once off or random activity. It rather involves a consistent and well-organised pursuit that involves migrants in the home country who lead a group to Turkey and then with the aid of other transnational community members living in Turkey show the group around the sites of their home country.
Considering the data above, one is left questioning: is there any other agenda behind these Turkey trips? In the context of Gülen’s commitments in Central Asia, Turam argues that there is an agenda to build up a powerful Turkic region that is committed to the principles of Turkish Islam. She also relates the fact that as well as the Gülen-inspired education network established in Kazakhstan, there are also strong trade links between Turkey and Kazakhstan, initiated by the same businessmen who support the schools. The political scientist Hasan T. Kösebalaban draws attention to some interesting insights in the context of Gülen’s views on European integration. He argues that ‘Fethullah Gülen is the leader of a formally apolitical social movement who nevertheless has influenced Turkish political debates, including those related to international relations’ (Kösebalaban 2003: 171). This has particularly been the case regarding European Union (EU) accession. Kösebalaban (2003) notes the polarisation of opinion regarding Turkey’s relationship with Europe. Some argue that European integration will lead to the loss of Turkish-Muslim identity. Alternatively, Gülen has been an avid supporter of EU accession from the start. He maintains that Islamic identity and European identity are not necessarily incongruous but can be complimentary. Given Gülen’s support for European integration of Turkey, it is plausible to suggest that the businessmen’s support for the Turkey trips organised by TIECS may have some long-term agenda in building up cultural and trade relations between the different communities. In the interview segment above the respondent points out that these subsidised Turkish trips are not peculiar to Ireland but also happen in the UK. It is therefore reasonable to contend that at least partly the motivation for these Turkish trips is to garner support in European countries for Turkish accession to the EU.
Transnational Network of TIECS
So far I have demonstrated that TIECS is involved in a variety of transnational practices with various transnational actors. I have illustrated that TIECS is strongly affiliated with the Gülen community and taps into its resources (cultural, human and to a lesser extent financial) in order to establish itself in Ireland. The society is first and foremost a Turkic religio-cultural society dedicated to promoting a positive image of Turkey and Islam to the Irish public. Using the framework of network analysis, this section further demonstrates the transnational networks of TIECS and the Gülen Community. This is useful in order to describe TIECS’s relationship with other points of the Gülen Community, as well as its organisational patterns, in a systematic way.
One respondent, Mehmet, attempts to express the transnational network of TIECS and the Gülen Community as follows:
…it is a network. For example, in Ireland, there is a main manager…there is the chief organiser and then there is another, another, another… For example, in Ireland there is one man who is looking after all of them, like a director of that country... Then there is another director of a continent, for example, Europe, Asia, Africa…They call each other…They call and we come together when they contact us…Many come, for example, from London, from Belgium. You know, they are doing the same things, with the same aims. They are just different names. They are all connected. If you want to go somewhere else in the world, that’s ok, just one call and other people will stay in the airport and will wait for you. Not doing this for money. But they will say “my friend is coming”. And they will do everything for you. For example, if you come with me they will do the same things and if they come here, I will do the same. If somebody comes, for example, from London, I will organise. And, you know, wherever we will go, to London, for example, we will stay in Fethullah Gülen’s organisations. We feel like in our home.
This interview excerpt will be referenced throughout this section. At this point I note that the extract reveals the massive network of the Gülen Community and TIECS’s participation within this network. It spans all of the world’s continents and a passage to another country is just a phone call away for its members. I concur with Levitt who maintains that this type of
‘access to “a membership card that works everywhere” encouraged participants’ sense of belonging to a transnational group. It also constantly reminds non-migrants that they too belonged to a social and religious cross-border community’ (Levitt 2001: 15).
This reference to a ‘membership card’ is, of course, figurative. Once one is a member of the Gülen Community, one has access to the whole community around the world. Indeed Levitt’s reference to non-migrants as part of this transnational group is also important. The businessmen in Turkey who may never leave their hometown can certainly be considered part of the transnational community. This solidarity is expressed through their various funding for Gülen-inspired initiatives.
It is useful at this stage to draw on the grammar of network analysis in order to describe the transnational ‘network infrastructure’ (Hagan 2002: 75) of TIECS. The above interview excerpt illustrates the multiple nodes (points) of the Gülen Community. Mehmet describes how members of these nodes can easily be accessed by members from other nodes within the network. In network analysis, ties are the conduits through which ‘resources flow between nodes. These resources can be material…and/or nonmaterial…e.g., information, services, innovations, influence, prestige…’ (Chafetz and Ebaugh 2002: 165-166). In the context of TIECS, the resources involve finances, influence and information. I illustrated earlier how businessmen in Turkey subsidise the one-week trip to Turkey for non-Turkish people. I also described how Fethullah Gülen’s thought is very influential vis-à-vis TIECS. The interaction between the various nodes of the Gülen-inspired network can be seen by a brief explanation of how natives of Turkmenistan became involved in TIECS. There are two Turkmen members actively involved in TIECS. They went to Gülen-inspired schools in their native country. Their teachers were able to tap into the Gülen Community network in order to enquire into potential voluntary openings in other nodes of the Gülen Community. In this case, TIECS was the chosen node and passage for these men was thus secured. I previously noted that TIECS invited members of other nodes of the Gülen Community to participate in the Interfaith Conferences: Kerim Balci from the Gülen-inspired newspaper Zaman and Ozcan Kelesh from Dialogue Society, based in London. These examples serve as evidence of interaction between the various nodes in the Gülen-inspired network.
Perhaps the most important transnational tie that keeps TIECS hooked into the transnational network of the Gülen Community is through the information tie. This channel is represented through the Gülen-inspired media conglomerate. Several members of TIECS regularly access these media forums. They watch STV through the internet; receive copies of Zaman and other Gülen-inspired journals by post; access Gülen’s ideas on his website, which involves hundreds of articles by him and like-minded people. There are also links on TIECS website to the Gülen website. All of these media forums can be accessed around the world as long as one has access to the Internet. This media tie connects the whole Gülen Community around the world in a single circuit. This indeed creates a sense of community belonging as ideas and discussions flow from node to node. It gives community members the feeling that they are, in Levitt’s words, ‘…part of a broad, powerful supranational movement’ (Levitt 2001: 17), which has morality, tolerance and dialogue as the avowed core principles. This helps create solidarity by-passing territorial boundaries.
Ties vary in intensity from network to network and between one node and another. Chafetz and Ebaugh note that
[t]ie density refers to the actual number of ties between all network nodes, relative to the logical possible number. In low density networks, a lot of nodes lack direct ties to one another but are heavily linked to one or a few common nodes. In high-density networks, there are numerous ties between virtually all the various nodes (2002: 166).
In this sense, the ties that connect the Gülen Community can be described as ‘low density networks’. There are thousands of nodes within the Gülen Community. Though my analysis indicates that some nodes are linked to other nodes, not all of the nodes of the Gülen Community are heavily linked. Nevertheless, they are all connected to the central node in Turkey. From this node, the media conglomerate broadcasts and publishes most of its work. This node acts as the centre of the network which concentrically moves outwards, incorporating various other nodes around the world.
Mehmet points out that despite geographical locations these Gülen inspired organisations have the ‘same aims. They are just different names. They are all connected’. Members can travel the world and will be accommodated in ‘Fethullah Gülen’s organisations’ in that country. He also points to a structure within the Gülen Community, whereby each country has a director answerable to a continental director, who in turn is accountable to Gülen and his closest associates. However, several of the interviewees insisted that though TIECS is affiliated with the Gülen Community, they remain largely autonomous and rely principally on Turkish business-people in Ireland for donations to fund their organisation.
Conclusion
The dominant focus of this article has been a description and analysis of the transnational endeavours of a Turkic, religio-cultural society based in Ireland. I began by outlining some of the literature on transnational migrant communities and noting that the most distinguished element of transnational migration is the consistent and steady connection of migrants with their home country. I then briefly described the character and work of Fethullah Gülen and his community. This was followed by a description of TIECS as a transnational community. I argued that some members of TIECS can be referred to as members of the Turkish diaspora. Noting that not all members of a transnational community need to be members of a diaspora, I argued that even the temporary migrants associated with TIECS can be articulated as members of this transnational community.
I then turned my attention to the projects run by TIECS, firstly focusing on the annual interfaith conferences and one-week trips to Turkey. I argued that the principal objective of TIECS in this regard is to promote its members’ understanding of Islam. They argue that Islam has been misrepresented in the West and has become synonymous with violence. TIECS aims to correct this version of Islam. Drawing on the work of Küçükcan (1999), I argued that due to various cultural, geographical and historical factors we should talk about Islam in the plural sense. I then drew on the work of Yavuz (2004) who argues that there are many different zones of Islam. Turkish Islam represents one of these zones and should be understood as a distinct interpretation of Islam, drawing predominantly on Sufi interpretations of the Koran. Fethullah Gülen actively promotes this form of Turkish Islam. It is my contention that TIECS adopts Gülen’s version of Islam in these interfaith conferences. The basic elements of Islam promoted in these conferences are love, tolerance and reason. These symposiums include Irish speakers from the Jewish and Christian tradition. Significantly, however, the spokes-people on Islam are of Turkish origin and are affiliated with the Gülen Community. This further supports my position that TIECS promote a form of Turkish Islam. It also contributes to the understanding of TIECS transnational engagements. We can see clearly both the transnational influence of Fethullah Gülen and the transnational affiliations with other Gülen-inspired organisations.
The next section referred to a more material transnational engagement of TIECS, through the promotion of guided trips to Turkey for Irish people and others. Drawing on interviewees, I established that these trips are subsidised by businessmen, who are members of the Gülen Community. Members of TIECS claim that these trips are subsidised in order to promote intercultural dialogue. However, given the fact that the Gülen Community is actively engaged in trade as well as education in Central Asia, I proposed that these businessmen subsidise these trips, at least partly, to increase trade between Ireland and Turkey. Another possibility for these subsidies may lie in the hope of promoting a positive impression of Turkey in Europe and thereby securing entry into the European Union. These are all possibilities that are difficult to prove. However, what is made clear in this section is the tangible transnational links between TIECS and the Gülen Community in Turkey as they receive financial backing for these Turkey trips.
Having established TIECS as a transnational community and illustrated the transnational activities of this society, I then drew on network analysis to systematically analyse the transnational relationship between TIECS and the Gülen Community. I argued that TIECS is part of the massive transnational network of the Gülen Community which stretches all over the world. There are several different resource types that pass through various ties between different nodes of the Gülen Community and keep TIECS hooked into the network. These include the influence of Fethullah Gülen, some financial assistance and access to the Gülen inspired media conglomerate, where members of the Community can access his latest thoughts.
The existence of TIECS on Irish soil is a testament to the changing nature of Irish society. Irish culture has moved from one defined by Catholicism, nationalism and economic isolationism, to one oriented towards economic and cultural liberalism. Ireland has moved from a nation that largely perceived itself as homogenous to one that is renegotiating its identity on the recognition of heterogeneity. We have witnessed unprecedented levels of immigration in Ireland in recent years and likewise unprecedented mixture of cultures and religions. Until recent years interfaith dialogue was dominated by Catholicism and Protestantism and the dialogue was often focused on crisis intervention. Islam is now the fastest growing religion in Ireland, with over 30,000 subscribers and has now become part of the national conversation vis-à-vis Irish identity. As suggested in another section these Muslims originate from a multitude of nations, counting Ireland, and from a number of the Islamic zones referred to by Yavuz (2004). TIECS is engaged in a competitive market with other elucidations of Islam. Whilst I saw no evidence for members of TIECS proselytising, they do attempt to promote their version of Islam, which is immersed in the Sufi tradition and can be referred to as Turkish Islam. The most important facet of this paper however is the articulation of the existence of transnational engagements and the illustration of how migrants often live ‘dual lives’, with dual allegiances. There have been a number of studies in the last decade detailing the experiences and obstacles of migrants in Ireland (see Cotter 2004 for a comprehensive list of published research in this area). However, Ronit Lentin (2005) attentively points out that in the Irish context there has been little attempt to analyse migrants’ networks. This paper has attempted to fill this gap in the research. More generally, by focusing on a religio-cultural society, I joined a minority of researchers who analyse the transnational engagements of one of the oldest transnational actors, namely reliously-inspired organisations.
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[1] I use the term Turkic here to refer to people from Turkey and Central Asia. This is the understanding of Turkicness presented by constituents of TIECS, whose members rely on a primordial understanding of ethnic affiliation which unites modern Turks to their premodern attachment with Central Asian Turkmen (see Turam 2003 for further discussion).
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